I would think the code is very small and easier to verify,
it doesn't especially have the ability to write files and act as a message board as Artifactory did.
And even if the agent tries to hack that, the attack surface is 1000x smaller and the possibility also much smaller.
But I'm not a security researcher, would love to see your hack to learn something (because that is what I do to sandbox agents that need services).
The way they had Artifactory configured was poor, and they were too reliant on it working perfectly, with no reason for such faith. Their config lacked any defence in depth and consideration of having a small TCB.
Part of the problem might be the lack of security focus, as these are AI R&D efforts first.
I think part of the problem is that they had been running that Artifactory configuration previously without any problems, and it gave them a false sense of security.
Similar thing happened with the UK AISI - they got caught out because the environments they had used for previous generation models turned out to be completely inadequate for the new generation of Fable-class models: https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/incident-report-unsanctioned-ag...
This was part of evaluating cyber security of their frontier models and they had a "sandbox" which, and I'm not a security researcher, looks not adequate from the first look.
Why do these super agents need package managers anyway? Can’t they basically instantiate most OSS projects from scratch anyway? Spin up a sub agent to write me an OS interface in C. Done